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Abstract
A substantial number of empirical studies on the linear relationship between
executive compensation and firm performance for European firms suggest that the
pay-performance sensitivity is not significantly positive. We argue that a nonlinear
structure fits the data better, because compensation contracts provide for minimum
performance benchmarks and an upper limit to the variable component of compen-
sation. We test for such discontinuities in the pay performance relationship, and
confirm their existence, using hand collected data from German Prime All Share
firms’ CEO bonus compensation. It turns out that there is a significant positive
relationship between return on assets and CEO bonus for ROA between -3% and
+20%. Performance sensitivity is then tested for changes over time between 2006
and 2009. Results reveal that during the first three years after the introduction of
a statutory transparency rule in 2005 governing the disclosure of individual CEO
compensation, significant changes to compensation contracts did not occur; but that
in 2009 the pay-performance sensitivity exhibited a significant increase, which coin-
cides with the passing of a law that requires supervisory boards to ensure that new
CEO employment contracts provide for ’reasonable’ compensation.
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1 Introduction
The incentives induced by bonus payments have been subject of recent discussions among
shareholders and rulemakers in Europe. Unreasonably strong incentives for very high
profits under neglect of incentives for sustainable performance were suspected to be one
of the causes for the real estate crisis to become a financial crisis. If high profits can only
be achieved by taking high risks, and if high losses are not borne by the decisionmakers
themselves, aggressive bonus contracts will provoke risk love in CEO decision making.
These discussions have led to regulatory action. While already in 2005, a law was passed
that forces listed corporations to publish data on individual executive compensation pay-
ments, in 2009 a new rule was introduced that forces supervisory boards to ensure that
remuneration paid to executive directors remains within ’reasonable’ bounds.
Recent evidence on the relationship between executive compensation and firm perfor-
mance points at an increasing pay performance sensitivity in the U.S. In contrast, Euro-
pean evidence on the pay performance sensitivity is, at best, mixed: most studies report
that the linear relationship between accounting measures of performance and executive
compensation is not significantly positive. But, if the pay-performance relationship in
Europe were weak, it would be surprising to see such a considerable debate about unrea-
sonably high bonus incentives for very high profits.1 Instead, the debate would probably
be focused on the absence of incentives for performance, and shareholders would call for
a stronger alignment between their interests and the interests of the directors. This calls
for a closer look on the relationship between corporate performance and bonus payments
in Europe.
We concentrate on the largest European economy - Germany - to provide evidence on a
significant and increasing pay performance relationship. The case of Germany is especially
interesting because in 2005, a law was introduced that forces German corporations to
disclose details on executive compensation individually for every director. In particular,
this offers the chance to solely concentrate on CEO compensation. Regular directors’ pay
is not exclusively tied to the performance of the entire firm, but is often determined by
looking at the performance of some division of the firm that the director is responsible
for, and whose performance usually remains undisclosed. In contrast, CEO pay is usually
determined by the performance of the entire firm, which can be observed more easily.
Mathematically seen, we treat the relationship between corporate performance and CEO
bonus as an inverse problem. Murphy (1999) suggests that there are discontinuities in
that relationship, and we account for these by allowing for nonlinearities. Our empiri-
cal tests confirm that there is a lower performance benchmark to be reached before any
considerable bonus is paid, and that there is a performance ceiling, where any additional
performance beyond that ceiling will not increase the bonus any further. Moreover, the
case of Germany provides us with the chance to analyze changes to corporate behaviour
subsequently to the introduction of a transparency law. We find that it took until three
years after the introduction of the new transparency rules until pay-performance clauses
German compensation contracts underwent a statistically significant change, which coin-
cides with the 2009 introduction of the obligation to provide for reasonable structures of
1See for instance Fong (2008), Lichfield (2008), Saltmarsh (2009), Thornhill et al. (2008), Treanor
(2010).
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compensation in new contracts. These results are consistent to the conjecture that firms
have adjusted their existing contracts under consideration of the responsibility to provide
for a pay-performance relationship different to that observed before the introduction of
the law.
Section 2 provides some theoretical insights into potential determinants of the structure
and the changes to CEO compensation contracts and develops seven testable hypothe-
ses. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology. Section 4 shows how the data were
retrieved, section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Theory and Literature Review
2.1 Theory
2.1.1 Goals of the Parties Negotiating Remuneration Contracts
The compensation contract for a German CEO, including the clause regarding the sensi-
tivity of bonus payments with regard to company performance, is the result of a negoti-
ation process between the supervisory board - or a subcommittee of it - and the (future)
officer. Once appointed, she is agent, and the supervisory board - representing the share-
holders - acts as principal.2 The supervisory board aims at agreeing on a contract that
fulfils the participation condition for high-quality candidates, but that also limits the
costs borne by the firm. The director - who usually will be risk averse in her private
affairs - aims at maximizing her remuneration. The more convinced she is that the firm
will be succesful under her rule, and the less uncontrollable influence on performance she
expects, the higher will be the performance sensitivity that she asks for.
The structure of compensation contracts varies between CEOs and regular directors.
The CEO has responsibility for the performance of the entire corporation, while regu-
lar directors are responsible for an individually limited set of duties. Therefore, CEO
compensation will generally be tied to the performance of the entire firm, while regu-
lar director compensation will at least in part be determined by a performance measure
related to this limited set of duties. We concentrate solely on the bonus payments of
CEOs, because measuring entire firm performance is considerably more straightforward
than measuring the performance that regular directors have achieved within their limited
set of responsibilities.
2.1.2 Outcome of the Negotiation
The parties’ goals are in conflict. The form of the contract the two parties eventually
agree upon is determined by their relative powers of negotiation. Regarding the bonus,
the contract will be in the form of a function that relates an amount in Euro to each
possible value of company performance (’bonus function’). It is reasonable to assume
2Jensen/Meckling (1976) introduce this view of the shareholder - manager relationship. Note that
during the negotiation process, the supervisory board acts as an agent of the shareholders, and the
principal/agent - relationship has three levels.
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that pay-performance sensitivity is nil below a certain performance benchmark, because
the minimum bonus payment is zero; and also that contracts provide for a cap to bonus
payments, as suggested by the German Corporate Governance Kodex, a code of conduct
which the firms are subject to comply with, except if they provide a publicly disclosed
explanation why they do not.
Usually, this function is not published. Therefore, an analysis of the performance sen-
sitivity will have to use the realized payments, which have to be published according
to German law. Since the Vorstandsverguetungsoffenlegungsgesetz of 2006, the revised
section 285 of the Handelsgesetzbuch states that firms have to provide details on director
compensation in their annual reports. They have to provide the amount of salary, bonus
and long term incentives granted for the financial year in question, and they usually have
to present the amounts for each board member individually, which is especially important
because the payments to the CEO are presented separately.3 However, such an analysis
will have to account for the dynamic nature of remuneration contracts. From time to
time, contracts are renegotiated; furthermore, the composition of boards is subject to
frequent changes, and new contracts are settled each time a change occurs.
2.1.3 Determinants of Systematic Changes to Remuneration Structures
Long-term systematic changes in new remuneration contracts are induced by changes in
the structure of the overall investment opportunity set or by changes in the risk attitude
of negotiating parties. Demand and supply on the market for high-potential human
capital, in contrast, can change rapidly and has a substantial impact on remuneration,
but are hard to be observed directly. Furthermore, the economic climate can influence
the outcome of remuneration contracts. For instance, when the perceived economy-wide
risk has increased, new directors might be hesitant to accept contracts with a large share
of variable compensation. The financial crisis has pointed at a potential effect of high
incentives for generating very high profits. Risk aversion of managers in the office - as
opposed to their risk preferences in private affairs - seems to have increased substantially
due to these incentives. After the crisis, there could thus have evolved a practice of
limiting incentives for generating unreasonably high profits.
And also, possible changes to corporate governance regulation or even to tax law can
change the goals of the negotiating parties. Regulation can have a direct impact, for
instance by imposing rules of conduct. The Vorstandsverguetungsangemessenheitsgesetz
(statute on the reasonableness of executive compensation) of 2009 is a good example: the
revised section 87 of the Aktiengesetz imposes a duty on supervisory boards to ensure that
remuneration contracts provide for reasonable and sustainable compensation structures.
This includes a comparison of an individual firm’s compensation package to the average
package, and also requires that bonus payments be determined by firm performance over
a time interval longer than one financial year (the ’sustainability rule’). Regulation can
also have an indirect impact: transparency rules, for instance, can induce changes to
contracts because monitoring by principals is made less costly. The Vorstandsvergue-
tungsoffenlegungsgesetz (statute on the disclosure of executive compensation) of 2005 is
3However, with a 75% majority in the annual general meeting, they can suspend the obligation to
present individual directors’ payments and grants separately.
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a good example. A disclosure obligation could lead to increased alignment between the
interests of shareholders and the interests of the supervisory board. This could result
in higher pay-performance sensitivity. On the other hand, the obligation could lead to
a race to the top: Park, Nelson and Huson (2001) present evidence of a Lake Wobegon
(see Hayes/Schaefer, 2009) effect in Canada; i.e. directors who observe that they are paid
under average request for an increase of their pay. This results in iterative increases of
average compensation. However, it is difficult to judge whether changes in remuneration
are driven by changes in overall performance, or by changes in remuneration contracts by
observing realized salaries. A “race to the top” might, however, be confirmed if the condi-
tional remuneration, granted if some fixed performance level were attained, has increased
over the years.
Systematic changes can be reinforced by the phenomenon of management fashion. Often,
specific changes to corporate governance structures are made by a number of firms at the
same time, and this fact attracts the attention of other firms who eagerly follow suit.
2.2 Related Literature
Aggarwal (2008) suggests two measures of the pay-performance relationship. The im-
plicit approach uses a regression coefficient where CEO pay is regressed on firm perfor-
mance. The explicit approach uses the fraction of total compensation that is made up of
performance-linked components. Similarly, Fahlenbrach (2009) uses stock ownership of
the CEO and the change in value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio for a 1% change
of the stock price. Such measures are ideal for contracts where the bulk of remuneration
consists of stock-based or option-based incentives, which holds for U.S. corporations.4
However, of the firms in our sample, only a minority use large-scale stock-based incen-
tive schemes, whereas between 30% and 40% of total compensation consist of annual
bonus. The total fair value of all long term incentives granted during the year accounts
for only less than 10% of total annual compensation. Therefore, for Germany, the re-
lationship between bonus and corporate performance is the pay-performance measure of
choice. We choose a regression-based measure which takes into account nonlinearities in
the relationship between accounting performance measures and CEO bonus.
Wilson (1992) provides early evidence in support of such nonlinearities for a sample of
U.S. firms by including squared regressors. However, in his study, only 13% of variability
in CEO compensation can be explained by size and performance. Miller (1995) then
finds that there is no evidence consistent to a linear relationship between changes to
executive salary and bonus and changes to firm performance among U.S. firms, but he
finds that nonparametric rank analysis reveals a positive nonlinear relationship. More
recently, Leone et al. (2006) find that changes to cash compensation (salary + bonus) are
twice as sensitive to negative stock returns as they are to positive stock returns, pointing
to an asymmetric pay-performance relationship. In line with a minor argument already
raised in Leone et al., Dechow (2006) argues that a potential reason for this effect is a
bonus contract that stipulates an upper bound. In his study using confidential data on
bonus schemes, Holthausen et. al. (1995) find that more than 50% of the firms in their
4For instance, in Jackson’s et al. (2008) sample, one third of total compensation consists of equity-
based incentives when considering medians.
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sample provide for an upper bound to bonus payments. Gaver et al. (1995) present
further evidence on lower and upper bounds to bonus payments.
For the U.S., Hall/Liebman (1998) document that while the pay-performance relationship,
measured explicitly, has risen dramatically between 1980 and 1994, most of the rise was
due to an increase in the value of existing stock and option holdings, but not due to
changes in compensation contracts. Jackson et al. (2008), find that generally, there is a
positive relationship between accounting earnings and CEO bonus. However, they suggest
that the relationship is weak for a low level of total earnings and that, to some extent,
alternative accounting based measures act as substitute for return on assets.
In Europe, the empirical evidence up to date, while not as voluminous as in the US,
is not consistently supportive of a positive pay-performance relationship. While El-
ston/Goldberg (2003) find evidence on a positive relationship between return on assets
and total compensation of the average board member during the years 1970 to 1986 in
a sample of 100 German firms, this relationship is not consistently significant in their
specifications. Schmidt/Schwalbach (2007) document a negative relationship between
abnormal returns and director compensation for the year 2005. Rapp/Wolff (2010) pro-
vide recent evidence on the nonexistence of a positive linear relationship between total
director compensation and operating performance for the years 2005 to 2009 for a sam-
ple very similar to the one used in this paper. In their specifications, which are linear,
operating performance is either significantly negatively or insignificantly related to total
compensation.
Bruce et al. (2007) report a significantly positive, but weak linear relationship be-
tween firm performance and executive bonus payments in the UK for 2001 to 2003.
Duffhues/Kabir (2008) find no positive linear pay performance relationship in their anal-
ysis of executive compensation in the Netherlands between 1998 and 2001. In a study
on 23 Swiss banks, Wanzenried et al. (2009) find that between 2002 and 2006, executive
managements’ compensation was negatively related to firm performance. In an earlier
study, Firth et al. (1996) find that there is no significant relationship between accounting
profitability or stock returns and CEO pay in Norway. Brunello et al. (2001) find that
the sensitivity of the amount of incentive payments with regard to corporate performance
is low for 1993 to 1996.
To sum up, this evidence suggests that either, the pay-performance relationship is indeed
weak, or, the standard linear methodology conceals some of the relationship between
performance and executive compensation.
2.3 Hypotheses
For German CEO compensation, the following hypotheses can be derived from the ob-
servations above:
H1: There is no relationship between performance and bonus below a minimum
performance benchmark.
H2: There is no relationship between (additional) performance and bonus above
a performance ceiling.
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H3: There is a positive relationship between performance and bonus between the
minimum performance benchmark and the performance ceiling.
H4: Pay performance sensitivity has begun to increase after the 2006 disclosure
obligation due to the disclosure effect.
H5: Pay performance sensitivity with respect to extremely high performance has
decreased after the financial crisis.
H6: The relationship between performance in the previous year and the bonus for
this year is higher in 2009 than before due to the 2009 sustainability rule.
H7: The conditional salary for a fixed level of performance has increased between
2006 and 2009 due to the race to the top.
3 Methodology
3.1 Overview
CEO bonus is used as a dependent variable in a nonlinear regression model with firm
performance as an explanatory variable, where pay-performance sensitivity is represented
by the resulting coefficient. In order to test hypotheses 1 through 3, the estimation will
account for a minimum performance benchmark (’floor’) and a performance ceiling (’ceil-
ing’) by testing for structural breaks in the performance sensitivity coefficient. In order
to analyze the dynamics of performance sensitivity, the estimation of this coefficient (i.e.
the slope of the bonus function) will be conducted year by year. In order to compare the
slope for different years, constant floors and ceilings are required in each year. Therefore,
assuming that the average floor and average ceiling do not undergo substantial change
over the years, the location of these two structural breaks ist estimated using the pooled
dataset, before conducting the year-by-year estimation.
This requires adjustments due to the panel structure of the data. This is done by ac-
counting for random firm effects. Furthermore, heteroskedasticity is detected, i.e. the
residual variance is higher especially for firms that are larger, and for firms that exhibit
higher performance. Thus, the test for structural breaks is made robust to both random
effects and heteroskedasticity.
If structural breaks are detected, the model has to be adjusted to account for the bench-
mark nature of executive compensation. For instance, a bonus ceiling does not imply that
above this ceiling, the relationship between performance and bonus will be zero. Rather,
the relationship between additional performance above the ceiling and bonus will be zero.
This structure is accounted for in section 3.3
3.2 Nonlinear Regression Model with Structural Breaks
3.2.1 Pay Performance Sensitivity as an Inverse Problem
While the object of research is the dynamic firm-specific CEO bonus function bonusit =
fit(performanceit) as stated in the remuneration contract, we can only observe realized
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pairs (performanceit, bonusit) for firms i = 1, ..., n and years t = 1, ..., T. Therefore, we
cannot estimate fit from the available data. If we assumed time-constant bonus functions,
we could estimate firm-specific functions fi if we had observations for a reasonable number
of years; yet four years is not enough. However, it is possible to estimate the average
bonus function ft and scrutinize its shape over time to identify systematic changes in
compensation practices.
Here, ft is parameterized in order to do so. A widely used approach for modeling com-
pensation is the linear model5
BONit = α+ βPROFITit + uit, (1)
where
BONit CEO bonus for firm i paid for year t
PROFITit performance of firm i in year t.
Pay-performance sensitivity is represented by β here. PROFIT is a measure of corpo-
rate performance, which could be net income, operating income, EBITDA or a similar
accounting measure.
In addition to firm performance, firm size is a major determinant of CEO compensation.
Generally, performance should be measured independently of firm size, because CEO
effort is to be rewarded, and CEO effort is related to relative performance and not to
absolute profit. This requires a relative performance measure such as return on assets or
return on equity. We denote this size-independent performance measure by PERF. Of
course, for the same level of return, a large firm will have a higher net income than a small
firm. Yet, the impact of size will usually not be explicitly discussed by the negotiating
parties, and will not be an argument of the bonus function f . Instead, the supervisory
board will implicitly translate the required return bechmark into a profit benchmark for
the firm according to its size, and the parties will discuss the relationship between profit
and bonus.
Therefore, in the model, the size effect cannot straightforwardly be separated from the
performance effect by including size as another linear explaining variable. The ’implicit’
size effect might not be linear. Instead, some authors use a log-transformation in order
to get rid of nonlinearities. This requires the size effect to be loglinear. We refrain from
imposing such a restriction, and use a parametric approach to capture the size effect.
The sustainability rule is accounted for by including lagged performance in the equation.
Performance is highly persistent; thus, the difference between lagged performance and
performance is used. The coefficient of this difference will be positive if there is a positive
reward when performance is high in two consecutive years. This will be the case if lagged
performance is considered when determining the bonus.
Apart from that, we include three control variables (leverage, market to book and idiosyn-
cratic risk). If we suspect that risk has a linear impact on the pay-performance sensitivity,
then the coefficient of the variable PERF will be of the form (β7 + β8RISK). Hence, an
interaction term between risk and performance is included. The resulting model is
5In order to estimate ft , the model (1) is estimated once for t = 1, ..., T.
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BONit = SIZE
β1
it
[
β2 + β3LEVit + β4MTBit + β5 (PERFit−1 − PERFit)
+β6RISKit + β7PERFit + β8RISKitPERFit
]
. (2)
Bonus is usually nonnegative. One possible approach to handle the nonnegativity is
the linear regression model for censored dependent variables. However, here, we aim at
modelling the right hand side so that it reflects the nonlinear, ’asymmetric’ shape of the
typical bonus function as devised in compensation contracts. Thus, we first confirm the
existence of structural breaks in model (2), and then, we set out a model that reflects
the two discontinuities in appropriate form and generates fitted values close to zero for
that range of independent variables where firms actually pay bonuses close or identical
to zero.
3.2.2 Testing for Structural Breaks in the Panel Dataset
H1, H2 and H3 assert that there are two structural breaks in parameters β7 and β8, and
that the break locations represent a minimum performance benchmark and a performance
ceiling. Introducing these breaks into model (2) results in the following model:
BONit = SIZE
β1
it
[
β2 + β3LEVit + β4MTBit + β5 (PERFit−1 − PERFit)
+β6RISKit + (β7 + γ71a,it + δ71b,it)PERFit (3)
+ (β8 + γ81a,it + δ81b,it)RISKitPERFit
]
,
where
1a,it =
{
1 Sa < PERFit ≤ Sb
0 else
1b,it =
{
1 Sb < PERFit
0 else.
We test for the structural breaks S1, S2 by following the general idea of the χ2 test
presented by MacKinnon (1989), which was later extended by Lamarche (2003) for the
situation of unknown break locations. MacKinnon applies a Gauss-Newton regression to
test for one structural break, whose potential location is known, for a nonlinear regression
model. To test for structural break at the breakpoint S, his test statistic is
U ′MZ(Z ′MΩMZ ′)−1Z ′MU, (4)
where
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U vector of residuals under the null hypothesis,
M = I −X(X ′X)−1X ′,
X vector of partial derivatives, where Xij =
∂fi(βj)
∂βj
where fi(β) is the right hand side
of (2),
Z ξ ∗X, where ξit = 1 if PERFit > S and ξit = 0 else, and ∗is multiplication element
by element, and
Ω variance-covariance matrix of residuals.6
However, our hypotheses imply two structural breaks. Therefore, we test for the first
break, confirm that it is significant, and define the model with one break as the model
under a second null hypothesis. Then, we test for the second break in the parameters
and confirm that the second break is significant, too. The location of our two breaks is
unknown, leading to two problems:
1. First, the location of our break(s) has to be found. We follow the supF 2 test
approach presented by Lamarche (2003): for each possible location of the break,
the test statistic is calculated. The location of the break is determined by searching
for the location with the highest test statistic associated to it. As possible location,
we consider all observed values of PERFit above the 0.15 quantile and below the
0.85 quantile of the empirical PERFit distribution, which is common practice.
2. The distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis is not known, be-
cause the location of the break needs to be estimated. Lamarche (2003) tests a
bootstrap approach for determining the distribution of the test statistic. We follow
his approach, using the wild bootstrap variant, which has been proven to provide a
promising level of performance. In particular, we estimate the model under the null
hypothesis. Then we draw one random variable x per firm and bootstrap iteration
from the Rademacher distribution,7 i.e. (P [x = −1] = 0.5, P [x = 1] = 0.5), and
multiply all actual residuals associated to that firm with x. We then add these
simulated residuals to the fitted values from the model under the null. We use 500
iterations.
3.2.3 Accounting for Heteroskedasticity and Error Components
Before calculating the test statistic, we adjust the residuals to account for heteroskedas-
ticity and random firm effects. This requires the estimation of a parametric form of the
residual variance-covariance matrix. Because not all off-diagonal elements are equal to
zero, we cannot use a standard heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator
as suggested by MacKinnon (1989). We follow the approach of Li/Stengos (1994), and we
6Note that in MacKinnon’s work, Ω is diagonal. In contrast, in our case it is block diagonal due to
the panel data structure. Thus, as suggested by Li/Stengos (1994), we transform the residuals into white
noise using Ω−1 before actually applying the test statistic, so that we can drop Ω from (4). We include Ω
here to illustrate the robustness of the statistic with regard to heteroskedasticity in the diagonal elements.
See section 3.2.3.
7Davidson/Flachaire (2008) show that this distribution is the best choice in their simulation study of
a heteroskedastic linear regression model.
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parameterize the variance - covariance matrix using a fixed covariance parameter (which
is the same for all firms) for the off-diagonal elements associated to one firm and a fully
unrestricted vector for the diagonal elements, and we restrict all other elements to zero.
This is a reasonable choice for two reasons. First, our determinant variables are likely to
capture most economy-wide time-dependent variation in bonus payments. On the other
hand, we cannot reasonably assume that we can observe all firm-specific factors that lead
to cross-sectional variation. Therefore, estimating random firm effects is a reasonable
choice. Second, we cannot rule out heteroskedasticity with respect to the covariance pa-
rameter, and a model for constant diagonal elements but varying off-diagonal elements
is available.8 However, for a situation where heteroskedasticity is possible both in the
diagonal and the off-diagonal elements, Baltagi/Bresson/Pirotte (2005) show that using
a fixed covariance parameter and a fully unrestricted vector of diagonals is the method
of choice.
Heteroskedasticity in the diagonal elements is clearly driven by firm- and year- specific
factors. However, the attempt to set up a parametric model for the residual variance
is risky, because misspecification will result in unreliable inference. Therefore, we apply
a semiparametric approach. In particular, we use kernel estimation for the diagonal
elements, described in detail by Robinson (1988), implemented by Li/Stengos (1994)
for the panel regression case. The element σ2it is calculated as a weighted average of
residuals (from the unrestricted estimation) associated to firm-years whose determinant
variables size, risk and performance are close to the values for firm-year it. Weighting is
accomplished by using the standard normal density as a kernel function.
We similarly estimate a variance-covariance function for the year-by-year regression, yet
here, the covariance parameter is zero. We apply a feasible generalized nonlinear least-
squares approach to estimate the models. We estimate the model ignoring the error
structure, estimate the variance-covariance matrix, and subsequently use its inverse for the
iterative minimization of the objective function. A fast procedure for obtaining the inverse
is presented by Li/Stengos (1994), where the block diagonal structure of the variance-
covariance matrix is exploited. We follow their advice to use the inverse for transforming
the residuals into white noise, which allows for a straightforward implementation of the
test for structural breaks, as explicitly stated in their paper. This enables us to drop Ω
from (4). Finally, we adjust the Li/Stengos approach for an unbalanced panel by allowing
for variable sizes of the blocks in Ω.
3.3 Modelling the Benchmark Structure of Bonus Compensation
If bonus payments are determined by multiplying a sensitivity coefficient with the distance
between the benchmark and the actual performance, and the benchmark is not exactly
zero, structural breaks are not sufficient for modeling the bonus function. Consider a firm
that only has one performance benchmark of 5% for return on assets (ROA), and pays an
amount of 0.01 mEuro for each percentage point of ROA above the benchmark. Assume
that it is certain that there is no minimum (constant) bonus to be paid independently of
firm performance and that the firm’s ROA is 12%. The bonus payment is 0.01 mEuro
*100*(12%-5%) = 0.07 mEuro. The true pay performance sensitivity is 0.07 mEuro / 7%
8See Roy (2002).
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= 1. Assume the structural break model has found the break at 5%. It tries to estimate
the performance sensitivity coefficient β from 0.07 mEuro = β * 0.12, which is 0.583.9
Therefore, we define a performance benchmark model that determines the sensitivity
coefficient from the distance between performance and performance benchmarks. We
hypothesize that there is a floor benchmark, where no bonus is paid below this benchmark,
and a cap benchmark, where any increase of performance beyond this cap does not alter
the bonus payment. This hypothesis implies that sensitivity coefficients β9, β10, β11 and
β12 in the following model are zero.
BONit = SIZE
β1
[
β2 + β3LEVit + β4MTBit + β5 (PERFit−1 − PERFit) + β6RISKit
+ (β7 + β8RISKit) min {BMa, PERFit}
+ (β9 + β10RISKit) max {0,min {BMb, PERFit} −BMa}
+ (β11 + β12RISKit) max {0, PERFit −BMb}
]
.
Estimation of the location of the benchmarks is slightly more difficult than the search
for structural breaks. We treat the benchmarks as parameters and include them in
the minimization procedure for the generalized nonlinear least squares objective func-
tion. Because derivatives with respect to BM1 and BM2 are not continuous, we apply
a derivative-free minimization approach (DFMA) for these, while we conduct a complete
Levenberg-Marquardt minimization at each iteration of the DFMA. First, we determine
the location of the first benchmark, and then, using its location, we determine the location
of the second benchmark.
We test for the existence of BMa by applying a standard test for nonlinear nested
models.10 We estimate the model with one benchmark to calculate from it the unre-
stricted sum of squared residuals (USSR), and estimate the model with the restriction
BMa = max {PERFit} to calculate the restricted sum of squared residuals (RSSR). Be-
fore calculating the sums, the residuals are transformed into white noise according to the
procedure suggested by Li/Stengos (1994) so as to to account for the panel data structure
and heteroskedasticity. To test for the existence of BMb, we proceed similarly, but cal-
culate the USSR from the model with two benchmarks, and calculate the RSSR using
the result for the first benchmark for BMa and the restriction BMb = max {PERFit}.
We calculate the test statistic
RSSR− USSR
USSR
N − P
Q
, (5)
where N is the number of all observations, P is the number of parameters of the unre-
stricted model and Q is the number of restrictions. The statistic has an F(Q,N − P )-
distribution.
9In regression model (3), this is equivalent to β7 + γ7.
10See Wooldridge (2002), p. 371 for details.
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3.4 Hypothesis Tests for Individual Parameters
In order to test for the signifinance of individual parameters βj , we test conditional on the
assumption that the structural breaks and benchmarks are at the location estimated from
the unrestricted model, and thus treat them as fixed. We first estimate the unrestricted
model and calculate the USSR, then we separately fix each individual parameter to zero,
reestimate and calculate the RSSR. Before squaring the residuals, these are transformed
into white noise following the procedure suggested by Li/Stengos (1994). The test statistic
is identical to (5).
3.5 Hypothesis Tests for Changes of Parameters over Time
Once the structural breaks and benchmarks have been found, the pooled panel dataset is
split into one set for each year. Parameters are estimated for each year separately. Then,
for two consecutive years, the dataset is pooled, and separately for each parameter, a
test is conducted for a structural break between the observations in the first year and
the observations in the second year. The test is identical to (5), where N is equal to the
number of observations in both years.
4 Data
Compensation data was hand collected from the annual reports for the years from 2006
to 2009. The initial sample consisted of all firms the shares of which were listed in the
Prime All Share Index of the German Stock Exchange, Frankfurt am Main. This index
represents all corporations who chose to comply with the advanced listing standards as
set out by the Deutsche Boerse AG.11 The index includes all members of the benchmark
indices DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX. i.e. the German blue chips, and (in 2009)
195 other firms. For a considerable number of firms, relevant compensation data was
not available in spite of the general disclosure obligation, especially for those firms who
chose to take advantage of the opt-out clause: The firm can abstain from disclosure of
individual directors’ compensation data if a 75% majority of shareholders chooses to give
their consent in the AGM. The number of firms for which data was available increases
over the years. Firms with a financial year end between January and June of year X were
assigned to year X-1, and firms with a financial year end between July and December of
year X were assigned to year X.
We included only those firms where information on the individual bonus payment for the
CEO was available. For firms where only one director was appointed, this sole director was
treated as CEO. When a CEO was in charge for less than 12 months during the financial
year, we annualized her bonus by simply extrapolating it to a 12-months interval, except
if she was regular director before. According to the disclosure statute, we count as bonus
all performance-related remuneration that is not explicitly of a ’long-term’ nature. Bonus
data (BON) is measured in millions of Euros.
11Most of the firms in the Prime All Share Index are German, but 27 firms are incorporated in another
European country.
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n BON Net Income Total Assets RISK PERF LEV MTB
2006 167 0.69 439.8 30,474.5 10.2% 8.0% 57.29% 3.47
2007 181 0.83 461.1 29,418.9 11.0% 4.8% 55.59% 2.89
2008 202 0.53 136.2 28,815.7 14.8% 1.3% 58.52% 1.46
2009 222 0.46 121.5 22,721.7 16.9% -1.5% 57.07% 1.96
total 772 0.62 273.8 27,563.5 13.5% 2.8% 57.15% 2.38
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Accounting data - which are from the consolidated accounts - are from Compustat Global,
where available. Missing accounting data was retrieved by hand from annual reports. Net
income and total assets (SIZE) is measured in terms of millions of Euros. As perfor-
mance measure PERF , net income is divided by total assets to provide for a performance
measure independent of size. This is common practice in the executive compensation liter-
ature.12 Capital market data for retrieving RISK and MTB is from Datastream. Table
provides general information on the firms in the sample. RISK is the idiosyncratic frac-
tion of stock price return volatility, i.e. a measure of idiosyncratic risk, which also serves
as proxy for the level of information asymmetry between shareholders and management.13
MTB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. LEV is total
assets minus book equity divided by total assets.
5 Results
5.1 Panel Regression Model
5.1.1 Base Model
Table 2 provides parameter estimates for the base model (2) without structural breaks
or benchmarks, estimated from the pooled data from 2006 through 2009. The estimate
for β7 provides support for a significantly positive relationship between performance and
CEO bonus compensation. However, the explanatory power of all regressors appears weak
in that model. The data exhibit further small but significantly positive (+) respectively
negative (-) relationships between bonus and leverage (-), bonus and the market to book -
ratio (+) and bonus and risk (-). Previous year net income is not a significant determinant
of CEO bonus. Firms with higher risk exhibit lower pay-performance sensitivity, consis-
tent to the hypothesis of risk-averse directors. The squared correlation between fitted
values and observed bonus is low (8.2%) and points at potential weaknesses of model (2).
This weakness could, for instance, be due to nonlinearities in the performance - bonus
relationship, or due to instability of parameter estimates over time. We focus on these
weaknesses by considering our hypotheses H1 to H3 with regard to the nonlinearities, and
considering H4 to H7 with regard to the dynamic nature of compensation contracts.
12See, for instance, Jackson et al. (2008), who discuss alternative measures of performance.
13This measure has also been used in the analysis of linear determinants of total board compensation
in German firms by Rapp/Wolff (2010).
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parameter value stat. p-value
β1 0.4038 826.9 <0.0001
β2 0.0532 244.28 <0.0001
β3 -0.0439 141.51 <0.0001
β4 0.0015 23.34 <0.0001
β5 -0.012 0.79 0.3744
β6 -0.0132 7.76 0.0055
β7 0.0686 37.02 <0.0001
β8 -0.0783 3.73 0.0538
n 772
SSE 4,091.17
TSSE 1,865.06
ρ2 8.2%
Table 2: Parameter Estimates for the Base Panel Regression Model
5.1.2 Structural Breaks in the Panel Regression Model
The tests for structural breaks in parameters β7 and β8 in model (2) show that both S1
and S2 in model (3), estimated from the pooled 2006-2009 dataset, are significant. The
first break is at a ROA level of -5.2%; the second break is at +7.1%. This indicates that
firms allow for a bonus payment even if net income is negative. 28% of the firms in the
pooled sample exhibit a ROA above 7.1%. This is surprisingly low, because we would
generally expect that the performance ceiling is identical to a level of performance which
can only be reached by top performing firms, for instance by the top 10%. However,
except for 2006, S1 is considerably higher than the annual average of ROA over all firms.
Break location stat. bootstrapped p-value
S1 -0.0520 7.1189 0.036
S2 0.0705 6.3433 0.020
Table 3: Location and Test Results for Structural Breaks in the Base Panel Regression
Model
Figure 1 shows the bootstrapped distribution of the test statistic for the lower break S1
under the null hypothesis of no break. Its shape is - to some extent - similar to that of a
χ2- distribution. While the test statistic is 7.12, 96.4% of the simulated values under the
null hypothesis are below it. Similar results on the shape and on the p-value hold for the
test for the second break.
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Figure 1: Bootstrap Distribution of the Test Statistic under the Null Hypothesis for Break
S1
Table 4 shows parameter estimates for model (3) which provides for two structural breaks
at S1 and S2. The inclusion of breaks doubles the explanatory power of the model, which
is still rather low (16%). There is strong evidence in support of hypotheses H1, H2 and
H3: while the pay-performance sensitivity for performance levels below S1 and above S2 is
close to zero (parameters β7 and β11), it is roughly 0.45 for performance levels between S1
and S2. This means that one additional percentage point of ROA would be rewarded with
an amount of 450.000 Euros multiplied with SIZE0.4. This result is remarkably different
from the results obtained by Rapp/Wolff (2010) in their recent study of a similar sample
of German executive compensation data, who find that the pay-performance relationship
is either insignificant or negative (depending on the specification of their model). The
reasons for this difference are: (a) the relationship between performance and executive
compensation varies among the different components of remuneration. The salary is
usually independent of performance. While long term incentives are measured based on
the fair value of the options and other instruments granted during the financial year
in the Rapp/Wolff study, the economically significant pay-performance relationship for
long-term incentive programs only realizes some years after the grant. Only the bonus
payment will exhibit a straightforward relationship to performance measured based on
accounting profit. (b) The relationship between performance and bonus is clearly positive
only for a limited interval of corporate performance, but not for very high or very low
performance. Therefore, forcing the relationship into a linear form over the complete
domain will conceal most of the pay performance sensitivity.
The low explanatory power of model (3) could, for instance, be due to misspecification
or be related to instability of compensation patterns over time. We will address both
potential reasons in the following paragraphs.
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parameter value -stat. p-value
β1 0.3769 971.04 <0.0001
β2 0.0534 211.70 <0.0001
β3 -0.0417 95.92 <0.0001
β4 0.0015 20.24 <0.0001
β5 -0.0008 3.37 0.0668
β6 -0.0225 11.92 0.0006
β7 0.0543 19.98 <0.0001
β8 -0.0960 6.3 0.0123
γ7 0.4491 134.61 <0.0001
γ8 -1.1781 4.94 0.0265
δ7 0.0065 3.32 0.0688
δ8 0.1571 8.36 0.0039
n 772
SSE 1,843.43
TSSE 1,711.12
ρ2 15.9%
Table 4: Parameter Estimates for the Base Panel Regression Model with Two Structural
Breaks
5.1.3 Year-by-year Estimation
When considering the results for the parameter estimates of model (3) when estimated
year by year, three remarkable observations can be made. First, performance sensitivity
factors change over time. Second, the pay-performance relationship becomes stronger
over time; in 2006, the coefficients of PERF were not significant, in 2009, the coefficients
for adjusted performance above the first structural break are both significantly positive.
Third, variability over time is substantial, because the use of year-specific estimates sub-
stantially increases explanatory power. However, it is difficult to draw further conclusions
from the observed values of parameters. The existing literature points at lower and upper
benchmarks for performance, and this calls for incorporating the benchmark structure
into the econometric model.
5.2 Benchmark Model
5.2.1 Panel Dataset
The estimates for the lower and upper performance benchmarks are -0.03% and 20%, and
both estimates are significantly different from the highest value of ROA among all firms
in the sample. That means that indeed, firms use a minimum benchmark and an upper
limit to the bonus. Principal - agent theory would suggest that the minimum benchmark
be above zero, possibly equal to the return provided by an investment into a diversified
portfolio. However, the lower benchmark is below zero, indicating that some portion of
the CEO bonus is paid despite of performance lying below the opportunity cost of capital.
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The upper limit to the bonus when a performance ceiling of 20% ROA is reached can be
seen as a reasonable cap to the bonus. In a competitive environment, a return on assets
above that limit would usually be an indicator of an unsustainable strategy.
Benchmark location stat. p-value
BM1 -0.0314 47.7324 <0.0001
BM2 0.2012 30.8373 <0.0001
Table 6: Locations and Test Statistics for the Performance Benchmarks
Under consideration of the explanatory power of the pooled benchmark model, this model
specification can be seen as a more plausible approach than the structural break approach
(3). Its explanatory power is 48.4%, when measured in terms of the squared correlation
between fitted right hand side values and observed bonus payments. The values of the
performance sensitivity parameters is in line with our hypotheses H1 through H3: the
relationship between ROA and bonus when ROA is below BMa is insignificant (β7), the
coefficient between the lower and the upper benchmark is 0.23 and significantly positive
(β9), and above the performance ceiling, the relationship is insignificant as well (β11).
There is a significant relation between the bonus and leverage (negative) and between the
bonus and the market to book ratio (positive). The coefficient for lagged performance is
insignificant (β5). Between 2006 and 2009,firms on average determine their bonus solely
with regard to performance in one financial year.
parameter value stat. p-value
β1 0.3976 922.68 <0.0001
β2 0.0312 32.38 <0.0001
β3 -0.0265 21.91 <0.0001
β4 0.0008 6.27 0.0125
β5 -0.0015 1.27 0.2601
β6 -0.0137 1.43 0.2321
β7 0.0070 0.43 0.5122
β8 -0.0592 0.83 0.3626
β9 0.2287 186.21 <0.0001
β10 -0.0433 2.30 0.1298
β11 0.1600 2.19 0.1393
β12 -3.8282 5.06 0.0248
n 772
SSE 424.15
TSSE 1,580.03
ρ2 48.4%
Table 7: Parameter Estimates for the Benchmark Model
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5.2.2 Year-by year Estimation
Inspection of parameter estimates from the year-by-year analysis reveals that both the
relationship between control variables and bonus and between performance and bonus
has only become significant in the later years. The main measure of pay-performance
sensitivity, β9, has been insignificant in 2007, after being significantly positive in 2007.
This could be an indication of compensation practices not in line with what standard
principal-agent theory would suggest. However, after 2007, the parameter has become
significantly positive again. Yet, when looking at the significance of changes, we see that
it was not before 2009 that β9underwent a significantly positive change. This provides
support for H4; however, it was not directly after the introduction of the disclosure obli-
gation, but only three years later that compensation contracts exhibited a significant
change towards a stronger pay-performance relationship. This casts doubt as to whether
transparency was capable of promoting adjustments to the structure of executive com-
pensation. As pointed out earlier in this paper, in 2009 another law was passed that
stipulates a duty of supervisory boards to ensure that compensation practices are within
bounds of ’reasonableness’. While it is argued that this law does not require the firms
to immediately change existing contracts but only applies to the design of new contracts,
some firms probably have begun to adjust their contracts to reflect the notion of rea-
sonableness. The significant change of β9 thus probably reflects changes in behaviour
induced by duties of supervisory boards, and not the disciplining effect of transparency.
Apart from that, the coefficient for lagged performance is insignificant except for 2007,
where it was negative. The fact that it has become positive, yet insignificant, shows that
there could be a subtle tendency not to reward steep upward surprises in performance.
Risk (β6) has become a significantly positive determinant of bonus, indicating that ex-
ecutives have become increasingly risk averse. This is loosely consistent to Wang et al.
(2010) who find evidence of increased risk aversion among executives following an increase
in regulatory action in the field of corporate governance.
With regard to H5, we can observe that there was no significant relationship between
additional bonus and additional performance above the performance ceiling until 2008.
However, in 2009, there is a significantly negative relationship (β11). This is a surprising
result, because it implies that the more the performance exceeds the performance ceiling,
the more the bonus to be paid to the CEO is reduced. Formally, we cannot find support for
H5, because changes to β11 were not significant (in table 8, dashes indicate variables that
underwent a significant change compared to the previous year). Economically, we have to
confirm H5 because indeed, the sensitivity parameter has decreased. However, a negative
parameter is inconsistent to prior theory. One possible explanation for the phenomenon
is that some firms with an extraordinarily high ROA were subject to substantial effects
on performance that were eliminated from net income before determining the bonus, and
the true determinant of the bonus was indeed lower than the performance ceiling.
H6 cannot be confirmed by the evidence, because neither were changes to β5 significant,
nor was it significantly different from zero itself. Thus, firms seem not to have considered
previous year performance for determining the bonus during the financial years 2006 to
2009.
In order to analyze a potential race to the top effect, we calculate the bonus that would
be paid to the CEO of a firm that is identical to the average firm of our sample, i.e.
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whose general characteristics are identical to the last line of table 1. As performance
and as lagged performance, we choose the midpoint between BMa and BMb. Because
we calculate the bonus for a firm that is hypothesized to have reached this midpoint,
we call this measure “conditional bonus”. Table 9 shows that this conditional bonus
decreased from 2006 to 2007, but began to increase from 2007 on, despite the decreasing
levels of actual bonus payments (caused by decreasing levels of firm performance). We
conclude that the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of a race to the top, i.e. our
hypothesis H7.
year conditional bonus
2006 2.38
2007 2.14
2008 2.73
2009 2.92
Table 9: Conditional Hypothetical Bonus paid to the CEO of the Average Firm
6 Conclusion
A nonlinear regression model with structural breaks was presented to show nonlinearities
in the relationship between performance and CEO bonus compensation. The common
benchmark structure of compensation contracts has been incorporated into the model.
German CEO bonus payments exhibit a strong positive relationship to return on assets
in the range between ROA of -3% to +20%. Below -3% and above 20%, there is no
significant pay-performance relationship. The pay-performance parameter over the in-
termediate range exhibits insignificant changes between 2006 and 2008, but a significant
and substantial increase from 2008 and 2009. The evidence indicates that while a new
disclosure obligation for individual CEO pay introduced in 2005 (in force from 2006) was
not capable of provoking subsequent significant changes to compensation structures, a
law that stipulates reasonableness of remuneration contracts, introduced in 2009, could
have led to higher performance sensitivity. We also calculated a measure of a conditional
bonus, i.e. the amount of bonus the average firm would pay to its CEO if the performance
would be identical to the midpoint between -3% and 20%. This measure has increased
each year between 2007 and 2009, while levels of realized bonuses have decreased due to
a decrease in realized profits. This indicates that transparency did not lead to a decrease
of conditional variable compensation.
22
References
Aggarwal, R.K. (2008): Executive Compensation and Incentives. Handbook of Empirical
Corporate Finance, 497-538.
Baltagi, B., Bresson, G. and A. Pirotte (2005): Adaptive Estimation of Heteroskedastic
Error Component Models. Econometric Reviews 24, 39-58.
Bruce, A., Skovoroda, R., Fattorusso, J. and T. Buck (2007): Executive Bonus and Firm
Performance in the UK. Long Range Planning 40, 280-294.
Brunello, G., Graziano, C. and Parigi, B. (2001): Executive Compensation and firm
performance in Italy. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 133-161.
Davidson, R. and Flachaire, E. (2008): The wild bootstrap, tamed at last. Journal of
Econometrics 146, 162-169.
Dechow, P.M. (2006): Asymmetric sensitivity to CEO cash compensation to stock returns:
A discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, 193-202.
Duffhues, P. and R. Kabir (2008): Is the pay-performance relationship always positive?
Evidence from the Netherlands. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 18,
45-60.
Elston, J.A. and L.G. Goldberg (2003): Executive Compensation and agency costs in
Germany. Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 1391-1410.
Fahlenbrach, R. (2009): Shareholder Rights, Boards, and Executive Compensation. Re-
view of Finance 13, 81-113.
Firth, M., Lohne, J.C., Ropstad, R. and J. Sjo (1996): The Remuneration of CEOs and
Corporate Financial Performance in Norway. Managerial and Decision Economics 17,
291-301.
Fong, D. (2008): Experts Divided Over Executive Pay Curbs in Germany. Deutsche Welle
online, www.dw-online.de, Oct 24, 2008.
Gaver, J.J., Gaver, K.M. and J.R. Austin (1995): Additional evidence on bonus plans
and income management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 3-28.
Hall, B.J. and J.B. Liebman (1998): Are CEOs really paid like Bureaucrats? The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 113, 653-691.
Hayes, R.M. and S. Schaefer (2009): CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect. Journal of
Financial Economics 94, 280-290.
Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F. and R.G. Sloan (1995): Annual Bonus Schemes and the
manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 29-74.
Jackson, S.B., Lopez, T.J. and A.L. Reitenga (2008): Accounting Fundamentals and CEO
Bonus Compensation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 374-393.
Jensen, M.C. andW.H. Meckling (1976): Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
23
Lamarche, J.-F. (2003): A robust boostrap test under heteroskedasticity. Economics
Letters 79, 353-359.
Leone, A.L., Wu, J.S. and J.L. Zimmerman (2006): Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash
compensation to stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, 167-192.
Li, Q. and T. Stengos (1994): Adaptive Estimation in the Panel Data Error Component
Model with Heteroskedasticity of Unknown Form. International Economic Review 35,
981-1000.
Lichfield, J. (2008): France looks at ways to curb ’fat cat’ salaries across the EU. The
Independent online, www.independent.co.uk, May 31, 2008.
MacKinnon, J.G. (1989): Heteroskedasticity-Robust Tests for Structural Change. Em-
pirical Economics 14, 77-92.
Miller, D.J. (1995): CEO Salary Increases May Be Rational after All: Referents and
Contracts in CEO Pay. The Academy of Management Journal 38, 1361-1385.
Murphy, K.J. (1999): Executive Compensation. Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds.),
Handbook of Labor Economics 3, 2485-2563.
Park, Y.W., Nelson, T. and M.R. Huson (2001): Executive Pay and the Disclosure Envi-
ronment: Canadian Evidence. The Journal of Financial Research 24, 347-365.
Rapp, M.S. and M. Wolff (2010): Determinanten der Vorstandsverguetung. Eine em-
pirische Untersuchung der deutschen Prime-Standard-Unternehmen. Zeitschrift fuer Be-
triebswirtschaft 80, 1075-1112.
Robinson, P.M. (1988): Root-N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression. Econometrica
56, 931-954.
Roy, N. (2002): Is adaptive estimation useful for panel models with heteroskedasticity
in the individual specific error component? Some Monte Carlo evidence. Econometric
Review 21,189–203.
Schmidt, R. and Schwalbach, J. (2007): Zur Hoehe und Dynamik der Vorstandsvergue-
tung in Deutschland. Zeitschrift fuer Betriebswirtschaft, Special Issue 2007, 111-122.
Saltmarsh, M. (2009): Europe Also Moves to Limit Executive Pay. New York Times
online, www.nytimes.com, Feb 6, 2009.
Thornhill, J., Milne, R. and M. Steen (2008): Accent on galit: Europe loses patience with
its wealthy elite. Financial Times online, us.ft.com, Jun 8, 2008.
Treanor, J. (2010): European bonus rules ’will prompt exodus of banks’. www.guardian.co.uk,
Oct 8, 2010.
Wang, H., Davidson, W.N. and Wang, X.: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure,
turnover and risk aversion. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 50, 367-
376.
Wanzenried, G., Piazza, D. and M. Pedergnana (2009): Board and Executive Compen-
sation in State-Owned Banks - Empirical Evidence for Switzerland. Working Paper,
University of St. Gallen/Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts.
24
Wilson, M.A., Chacko, T.I., Shrader, C.B. and E. Mullen (1992): Top Executive Pay and
Firm Performance. Journal of Business and Psychology 6, 495-501.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT
Press, 2002.
25
 
 
001 "Volatility Investing with Variance Swaps" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle and 
Elena Silyakova, January 2010. 
002 "Partial Linear Quantile Regression and Bootstrap Confidence Bands" by 
Wolfgang Karl Härdle, Ya’acov Ritov and Song Song, January 2010. 
003  "Uniform confidence bands for pricing kernels" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 
Yarema Okhrin and Weining Wang, January 2010. 
004 "Bayesian Inference in a Stochastic Volatility Nelson-Siegel Model" by 
Nikolaus Hautsch and Fuyu Yang, January 2010. 
005  "The Impact of Macroeconomic News on Quote Adjustments, Noise, and 
Informational Volatility" by Nikolaus Hautsch, Dieter Hess and David 
Veredas, January 2010. 
006 "Bayesian Estimation and Model Selection in the Generalised Stochastic 
Unit Root Model" by Fuyu Yang and Roberto Leon-Gonzalez, January 
2010. 
007 "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies" by Erik R. 
Fasten and Dirk Hofmann, January 2010. 
008 "Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic 
Complementarities" by Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniels and Frank 
Heinemann, January 2010. 
009 "Predicting extreme VaR: Nonparametric quantile regression with 
refinements from extreme value theory" by Julia Schaumburg, February 
2010. 
010 "On Securitization, Market Completion and Equilibrium Risk Transfer" by 
Ulrich Horst, Traian A. Pirvu and Gonçalo Dos Reis, February 2010.  
011 "Illiquidity and Derivative Valuation" by Ulrich Horst and Felix Naujokat, 
February 2010. 
012 "Dynamic Systems of Social Interactions" by Ulrich Horst, February 
2010. 
013 "The dynamics of hourly electricity prices" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle and 
Stefan Trück, February 2010. 
014  "Crisis? What Crisis? Currency vs. Banking in the Financial Crisis of 
1931" by Albrecht Ritschl and Samad Sarferaz, February 2010. 
015  "Estimation of the characteristics of a Lévy process observed at arbitrary 
frequency" by Johanna Kappusl and Markus Reiß, February 2010. 
016  "Honey, I’ll Be Working Late Tonight. The Effect of Individual Work 
Routines on Leisure Time Synchronization of Couples" by Juliane 
Scheffel, February 2010. 
017  "The Impact of ICT Investments on the Relative Demand for High-
Medium-, and Low-Skilled Workers: Industry versus Country Analysis" 
by Dorothee Schneider, February 2010. 
018 "Time varying Hierarchical Archimedean Copulae" by Wolfgang Karl 
Härdle, Ostap Okhrin and Yarema Okhrin, February 2010. 
019 "Monetary Transmission Right from the Start: The (Dis)Connection 
Between the Money Market and the ECB’s Main Refinancing Rates" by 
Puriya Abbassi and Dieter Nautz, March 2010. 
020 "Aggregate Hazard Function in Price-Setting: A Bayesian Analysis Using 
Macro Data" by Fang Yao, March 2010. 
021 "Nonparametric Estimation of Risk-Neutral Densities" by Maria Grith, 
Wolfgang Karl Härdle and Melanie Schienle, March 2010. 
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2010 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
 SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2010 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
022 "Fitting high-dimensional Copulae to Data" by Ostap Okhrin, April 2010. 
023 "The (In)stability of Money Demand in the Euro Area: Lessons from a 
Cross-Country Analysis" by Dieter Nautz and Ulrike Rondorf, April 2010.   
024 "The optimal industry structure in a vertically related market" by 
Raffaele Fiocco, April 2010. 
025 "Herding of Institutional Traders" by Stephanie Kremer, April 2010. 
026 "Non-Gaussian Component Analysis: New Ideas, New Proofs, New 
Applications" by Vladimir Panov, May 2010. 
027 "Liquidity and Capital Requirements and the Probability of Bank Failure" 
by Philipp Johann König, May 2010. 
028 "Social Relationships and Trust" by Christine Binzel and Dietmar Fehr, 
May 2010. 
029 "Adaptive Interest Rate Modelling" by Mengmeng Guo and Wolfgang Karl 
Härdle, May 2010. 
030 "Can the New Keynesian Phillips Curve Explain Inflation Gap 
Persistence?" by Fang Yao, June 2010. 
031 "Modeling Asset Prices" by James E. Gentle and Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 
June 2010. 
032 "Learning Machines Supporting Bankruptcy Prediction" by Wolfgang Karl 
Härdle, Rouslan Moro and Linda Hoffmann, June 2010. 
033 "Sensitivity of risk measures with respect to the normal approximation 
of total claim distributions" by Volker Krätschmer and Henryk Zähle, 
June 2010. 
034 "Sociodemographic, Economic, and Psychological Drivers of the Demand 
for Life Insurance: Evidence from the German Retirement Income Act" 
by Carolin Hecht and Katja Hanewald, July 2010. 
035 "Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design" by 
Ulrich Horst and Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, July 2010. 
036 "Why Do Financial Market Experts Misperceive Future Monetary Policy 
Decisions?" by Sandra Schmidt and Dieter Nautz, July 2010. 
037 "Dynamical systems forced by shot noise as a new paradigm in the 
interest rate modeling" by Alexander L. Baranovski, July 2010. 
038 "Pre-Averaging Based Estimation of Quadratic Variation in the Presence 
of Noise and Jumps: Theory, Implementation, and Empirical Evidence" 
by Nikolaus Hautsch and Mark Podolskij, July 2010. 
039 "High Dimensional Nonstationary Time Series Modelling with Generalized 
Dynamic Semiparametric Factor Model" by Song Song, Wolfgang K. 
Härdle, and Ya'acov Ritov, July 2010. 
040 "Stochastic Mortality, Subjective Survival Expectations, and Individual 
Saving Behavior" by Thomas Post and Katja Hanewald, July 2010. 
041 "Prognose mit nichtparametrischen Verfahren" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 
Rainer Schulz, and Weining Wang, August 2010. 
042 "Payroll Taxes, Social Insurance and Business Cycles" by Michael C. 
Burda and Mark Weder, August 2010. 
043 "Meteorological forecasts and the pricing of weather derivatives" by 
Matthias Ritter, Oliver Mußhoff, and Martin Odening, September 2010. 
044 "The High Sensitivity of Employment to Agency Costs: The Relevance of 
Wage Rigidity" by Atanas Hristov, September 2010. 
045 "Parametric estimation of risk neutral density functions" by Maria Grith 
and Volker Krätschmer, September 2010. 
 
 SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2010 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
046 "Mandatory IFRS adoption and accounting comparability" by Stefano 
Cascino and Joachim Gassen, October 2010. 
047 "FX Smile in the Heston Model" by Agnieszka Janek, Tino Kluge, Rafał 
Weron, and Uwe Wystup, October 2010. 
048 "Building Loss Models" by Krzysztof Burnecki, Joanna Janczura, and 
Rafał Weron, October 2010. 
049 "Models for Heavy-tailed Asset Returns" by Szymon Borak, Adam 
Misiorek, and Rafał Weron, October 2010. 
050 "Estimation of the signal subspace without estimation of the inverse 
covariance matrix" by Vladimir Panov, October 2010. 
051 "Executive Compensation Regulation and the Dynamics of the Pay-
Performance Sensitivity" by Ralf Sabiwalsky, October 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
